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Healthcare is riddled with injustice and inequity. Clinicians strive to create better, 
more just systems, and experience deep moral distress when we are unable to do this. 
We care for the broken but expect perfection of ourselves. Limitless need combined 
with imperfect systems and impossible expectations of ourselves is the perfect recipe 
for burned out and broken doctors. In a review of physician suicides in the United 
States during the 20th Century, Legha argued that despite a growing sense of the 
importance of physician well-being, the expectations of perfection and the difficulties 
of accepting personal vulnerability remained major unresolved drivers of profound 
physician distress. Ethics and justice must be questions not only in relation to patient 





work. Here we explore the injustice that arises from two major and longstanding 
sources of clinician distress: the experience of clinical uncertainty, and coping with 
errors in practice.  
 
When writing about his early medical experiences, Siddhartha Mukherjee commented 
he ‘never expected medicine to be such a lawless, uncertain world.’ Atul Gawande 
noted in his book Complications that ‘medicine’s ground state is uncertainty.’ He 
observes that this experience is ‘wrenching’ for patients, ‘difficult’ for doctors, and 
that it is ‘hard to grasp how deeply uncertainty runs’. Rachel Clarke, writing of her 
experience as a young doctor in Your Life in My Hands, described uncertainty in acute 
decision-making: ‘As a newly minted doctor, I knew twenty-eight causes of 
pancreatitis, the names of all two hundred and six bones in the human body, the 
neurophysiology of stress and fear, but not - not even remotely - how to make the 
emergency decisions that, if I got them wrong, might end up being the death of 
someone.’  
Uncertainty is also intrinsically linked with the risks and experience of error. David 
Hilfiker wrote a landmark description of the trauma of being human and being a 
clinician, in his book Healing the Wounds. His words from that book still resonate 
strongly now: ‘Because doctors do not discuss their mistakes, I do not know how 
other physicians come to terms with theirs’; ‘we see the horror of our mistakes, yet 
we cannot deal with their enormous emotional impact’; ‘A physician is even less 
prepared to deal with his mistakes than is the average person’. He comments that 
continuous decision-making by physicians in the care of ill patients makes even 
determining if a mistake has been made challenging. It can be hard to know at any 
given moment whether small and large decisions, made hours or days ago, could 
contribute adversely to a current situation. Danielle Ofri, writing in How Doctors 
Feel, described the necessity of reaching an ‘emotional armistice’ with the fear and 
anxiety of being a clinician, reflecting that the wrestling with lack of knowledge and 
fear of making errors has both an emotional cost but also drives clinicians to better 
themselves and their knowledge. However, the internalisation of error is such that the 
negative emotion does not attach to the act, but to the person. As Atul Gawande wrote 
in the context of personal error, ‘I felt a sense of shame like a burning ulcer. This was 
not guilt: guilt is what you feel when you have done something wrong. What I felt 






We teach how to rationally approach diagnostic uncertainties, but not what it is like to 
carry the emotional burden of uncertainty or of error.  Aristotle’s concepts of virtue as 
being practical, and about doing good, pervade the clinical identity. The philosopher 
Quassim Cassam identified a list of core virtues of the clinical generalist, including 
empathy, humility, testimonial justice, and situational judgement. The process of 
becoming a clinician, and continuing to develop in lifelong practice, forms a specific 
social identity so that clinicians act from shared values and behave in accordance with 
these shared beliefs. However, striving to live up to these ideals presents huge 
challenges. Hilfiker, examining his own distress and its relationship to the challenges 
of maintaining the physician identity and meeting huge patient need, wrote 
‘Furthermore, as a physician I was defined by society, by the medical profession, and 
by my own expectations […] When this pressure was combined with the roller-
coaster of pressures of the job, the emotional burden often seemed overwhelming. [...] 
Not surprisingly, I could not sustain the degree of openness required to go from 
deepest need to deepest need…’.  
             
The difficulties of discussing the personal experience error and uncertainty create a 
state of injustice. Clinicians lack formal and informal places in which these 
experiences are spoken of, and often find it unnatural and uncomfortable to share the 
emotional work and challenges presented. The injustice associated with suppression 
of voices, knowledge and experience has been termed epistemic injustice 
(epistemology refers to theories of knowledge). There are two broad forms of 
epistemic injustice. The first is ‘testimonial injustice’, in which someone’s voice and 
knowledge are ignored or disavowed for some reason of bias. Examples of this would 
include a misogynistic or racist failure to listen to or value another’s knowledge. The 
second type of epistemic injustice occurs when there is no shared language or 
insufficient shared concepts to permit interpretation of experience, such as occurred to 
women trying to speak of postnatal depression before that diagnostic label existed. 
This is referred to as hermeneutical injustice, where hermeneutics refers to 
interpretation of knowledge. The discussion of epistemic injustice in medicine 
appropriately focuses on systems and clinicians that ignore, miss, or fail to hear the 
voices and knowledge of those they endeavour to care for. (See, for instance, work by 





might also happen without fault on the part of the hard-pressed physician. Whether or 
not there is any fault at stake, however, what is important is that there are effective 
ways of addressing insensitivities and mistakes. However, medical traditions, legal 
and care systems fail to generate a just environment in which the lived personal 
experience of uncertainty and error can easily be spoken of without stigmatising the 
clinician. The discursive context is akin to one of taboo, and it is created by the 
profession’s collusion with a fantasised idea of medical omniscience that sets all real 
doctors up for a fall. And so all too often there is nothing for it but to play along with 
the fantasised superhuman standard, hope nothing ever goes wrong, and suffer the 
deep shame that Gawande speaks of when it does. This injustice may contribute 
powerfully to the clinician experience of moral distress. When it happens, clinicians 
are all too often left alone to negotiate the terrain alone. 
           
To address and change this, we need to shake off the twin fantasies of omniscience 
and infallibility. We need to equip clinicians with the tools to cope with uncertainty 
and error without shame, and without professional taboo, and embed them in 
organisations and systems that support these processes. This is not just about 
addressing causes of burn-out, but about addressing the underlying clinician identities 
and beliefs that subconsciously but so powerfully shape clinician behaviours. We 
should train ourselves in self-care and care of each other. Self-compassion is 
associated with lower rates of burn-out, tolerance of uncertainty, and workload stress. 
We propose that this may also be complemented by self-justice: a state of mindful 
self-analysis that examines the need to be just to ourselves as well as compassionate 
to ourselves. An understanding of justice applied with compassion will give clinicians 
the reasons needed to be kind to themselves and others, without reducing the rigor 
with which they practice their profession. It is right and just and necessary to create 
the spaces and processes and systems that foster understanding of uncertainty, error 
and support of clinicians engaged in work that permeates much of their identity and 
often most of their waking hours. . Arthur Kleinman talked of remaining present as a 
moral act at the heart of physician responsibility. Present to our needs, uncertainties, 
successes and failings, and prepared to speak of them and listen to those of others, we 







It is therefore profoundly ironic that a profession that is highly regulated, held to 
ethical standards, and has at its heart the care of other human beings, fails to articulate 
well for the care of its own members. There is some evidence of improvement, with a 
drive to better error reporting systems, more supportive investigations of errors and a 
willingness to review system failures alongside personal error. However, rates of 
moral distress, burn out and suicide show how much more we need to do. The 
personal experience of uncertainty and error is difficult to articulate in the context of 
professional medical practice, with the consequence that we lack a fair and just 
framework in which to examine these important causes of burnout. A just, ethical 
practice would be one in which there is transparency, candour, and a duty of care that 
clinicians extend to their colleagues, and that regulators address and support. In such a 
framework, a transparent, supportive review of error would be easier, and good 
clinicians who make mistakes (and surely, all clinicians make mistakes) will be better 
cared for and better placed to support those who suffer as a consequence of the error. 
 
In his 1971 work A Theory of Justice, John Rawls proposed a thought experiment in 
which participants gathered to design social and political systems, but the participants 
worked behind a veil of ignorance. They would not know what position they would 
assume in society, what gender, what race, what country. If medical care was 
designed behind such a veil, without knowing one’s status as patient or clinician or ill 
or burnt out practitioner, the model might look not just at how clinicians care for 
patients, but how they care about themselves.  
 
At a moment when physicians and health care providers are stretched sometimes 
beyond limits by a global pandemic, we are reminded of the immediate need to care 
for all health care providers concurrently. As noted in the House of God, ‘How can we 
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